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one common grantee as against the other, which cannot be considered
vested rights passing with the conveyance of the property. If both
the plaintiffs and the defendants are indeed common grantees, then
under the estoppel doctrine of easement, they would have a cause of
action to enjoin the obstruction of that easement by the other. However, in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to enjoin the defendant's
obstruction of the vacated street, the court used language indicating
adherence to the "narrow" rule. In using the "necessary for reasonable access" test, the court denied easement rights to these nonabutting property owners without having previously defined the limits of
that standard.
MORTON G. HmAN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Municipal Corporations-Labor Unions-Right of Municipal
Employees to Strike-Governmental and Proprietary Functions.
In Port of Seattle v. InternationalLongshoremen's Union,' the Washington court pronounced that municipal corporations are immune to
strikes which would endanger the public health or safety.
The pertinent facts of the case under review are as follows: The
Port of Seattle is classified as a political subdivision of the state and a
municipal corporation. Its functions include the operation, development, and regulation of a system of harbor improvements and railand-transfer-terminal facilities within that system. The private operators of port and dock facilities in the area had collective bargaining
contracts with Local 9 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. The port employed about 350 employees, 24 of
whom were union members at the time of the controversy. While the
port made use of the union's hiring hall, it had consistently refused to
enter into a collective bargaining contract with the union. The union
made demands for higher wages for certain of its members who
were employed by the port. Upon rejection of these demands, the
union members went on strike and began picketing, which resulted
in the cessation of the port's operations. On the same day, January
18, 1958, the port filed a bill to enjoin the union from striking and
picketing. The trial court concluded the strike was illegal and granted
a temporary injunction on January 22, 1958.
This decision was affirmed by the Washington supreme court. The
court began its rationale by taking recognition of the two conflicting
1152 Wash. Dec. 267, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
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principles involved: (1) the right of organized labor to strike, and
(2) the general immunity of government from a strike. The union
contended the port constituted a mere "proprietary" function, and
therefore should have no immunity from strikes.2 The court, speaking
through Judge Finley, rejected this argument. It pointed out that
the "government-proprietary" distinction was developed in common
law for the purpose of mitigating injustice resulting from an unqualified application of sovereign immunity to personal injury actions.
The court observed that the importance of the distinction was "waning"' and remarked that in any event there was no logical basis for
its application to the case at hand.'
It is significant that the Washington court explicitly abolished the
proprietary test of immunity from strikes. This test has received
criticism.' At the present there is still a divergence of authority on
this issue, but the majority appear to side with the view taken in the
Port of Seattle case.'
The abandonment of the proprietary test in Washington could not
be complete until the hovering form of Christie v. The Port of
Olympia7 was legally buried or at least camouflaged. The Christie
case, occurring eleven years prior, also involved a municipal port and
the Longshoremen's Union. However, the Port of Olympia had
2 Local 266, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Salt River Project Agricultural
Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
3
The court cites as authority for this proposition, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957). However, the reason this case discarded the governmental-proprietary distinction was that the Florida court rejected completely the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
4 Perhaps difficulty could be avoided by wording the issue in these cases without
using the term, "immunity." For example, the problem could be simply stated as:
"Is such a strike unlawful, or against public policy ?" The use of the word "immunity,"
with respect to the right to strike, is a misnomer, since there is no legal liability from
which to be "immune," in the usual sense of the word.
5 RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MuNICn'AL EiiPLOYE LAW, 53-56 (1946).
13Cases upholding the distinction: Local 266, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
AFL v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30,
275 P.2d 393 (1954) ; Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83
A.2d 482 (1951) ; City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507,
131 A.2d 59 (1957). In the Manchester and Norwalk cases, the distinction was only
upheld by dictum. Cases repudiating the distinction: City of Los Angeles v. Los
Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); City of
Detroit v. Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. & Elec. Ry. Employees, 332 Mich.
237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n
of St. & Elec. Ry. Employees, 85 Ohio App. 153, 90 N.E.2d 711 (1949) ; City of Alcoa
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn.
1957) ; New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209
(1956). The Ohio, New York and Michigan cases were decided on the basis of
statutes. The New York case also employed the argument that even if the proprietary
test did apply, the operation of a transit system was a governmental function, thus
coming close to the view taken by the Washington court.
7 27 Wn.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
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entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union. To
ascertain the validity of this agreement, the union arranged for this
test case. The Washington supreme court held the bargaining agreement valid.
The rationale in the Christie case focused on the issue of whether
the port had the power to make such a contract. The finding of such
power began with the argument that, since public ports have statutory
authority to maintain and operate the port, they must have implied
authority to employ longshoremen. And while the statute grants no
power into collective bargaining contracts, the court reasoned:
We are dealing with a very general grant of powers to a municipal

corporation, but one that is not created to govern in any such sense
as in the case of a county or a city, but only to engage in purely
proprietary undertakings in direct competition with private corporations.... (Emphasis added.)

Thus it seems possible that the Christie case did employ the governmental-proprietary distinction, though not with respect to the
"immunity" issue. An attempt to rationalize the Port of Seattle and
Christie cases at this point would indicate a rule that the "governmental-proprietary" test is applicable with respect to the union's right
to collective bargaining,8 but the "public health and safety" test is
proper with respect to the union's right to strike.
In the principal case the Christiedecision was mentioned, admitting
it inferred that a municipal port has the power to enter into collective
bargaining agreements. However, the court said there was a "significant difference" between the power of a public port to make collective bargaining contracts and the power of its employees to strike.'
This reasoning might be persuasive, were it not for the following
8Itmust be remembered that in labor disputes involving municipal corporations, the
National Labor Relations Act is of no avail to the union. This statute is expressly
intended not to regulate employer-employee relationships of municipal corporations.
"The term 'employer'. . . shall not include ... any state or political subdivision ..."
National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 152(2) (1947). The
Washington labor disputes act, RCW 49.32.010-.100, makes no express mention of the
state or its political subdivision. Therefore, this statute is also of no assistance to
municipal employees, following the usual rule that general legislation does not include
the sovereign. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). House
Bills 241 and 242, designed to make RCW 49.32.010 applicable to certain municipal
corporations, were introduced in the 1957 session of the Washington legislature, but
failed of passage.
9In Local 266, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954), the
court concluded the right to strike could not be separated from the right to collective
bargaining, thus placing itself squarely contradictory to the rationale in the Port of
Seattle case. The Salt River case was mentioned in the case at hand, the court flatly
stating that it refused to follow the Arizona case.
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statement in the Christie case: "The exercise of the power [to bargain with a union] was more than merely expedient. It was necessary
to insure the continued performance of 'the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation.'... [since otherwise the men would
have] quit work."
The court in the Christie case also stated that the bargaining contract was consistent with public policy, since if the contract had not
been made, "the men would not have continued to work," and the
resulting labor dispute would have harmed the war effort (the bargaining contract was made in 1944). In saying this, the Christie
decision seems to infer the right of a union to strike against a public
port. Moreover, it is to be noted that the Christiecase uses a publicsafety argument to justify the inference of the union having the right
to collective bargaining. In the Port of Seattle case, a public-safety
argument is used to deny the union's right to strike. In view of these
facts, it seems that an argument can be made that the Port of Seattle
and Christie cases are inconsistent in spirit, if not in the letter.
Having abolished the proprietary test, the court was left without a
legal theory to determine the case. Judge Finley solved this problem
by declaring:
In our view, the primary reason for the modern day vitality of the
principle that the government is immune to strikes is to safeguard and
protect public health and safety. The public health and safety are not

the basis for distinguishing between governmental and proprietary
functions of a municipality .... "0 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, by judicial fiat, Washington municipal corporations are
immune from strikes by their employees if such strikes will endanger
the public health or safety. Having determined the test, the court
now proceeded to apply it:
We are conscious of the fact that the common law may change with
the changes in "the institutions and condition of society in this state"
(see RCW 4.04.010), but this court cannot readily explore and ascertain accurately the effect on the public health and safety of a strike
against a particular municipal function. It would be impossible to do
so accurately on the state of the record before us in this case. The
legislature is better equipped to investigate such matters extensively
and fully with respect to each municipal function; and, through its
general modus operandi, it can determine more appropriately the
public policy of this state in this evolving field of conflicting interests
10 152

Wash. Dec. 267, 271, 324 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1958).
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and social regulation and control. Absent legislation under the cir-

cumstances here involved, we feel compelled to hold that the right to
strike is subordinate to the port's immunity therefrom. It logically
follows that the strike in this case was inappropriate."
Thus, having created a test of public policy, the Washington court
modestly declined to apply it. It would seem that the danger to the
public health and safety could be more accurately determined by the
court in each individual case on the basis of its own facts rather than
by a formula determined by the legislature to attempt to cover all
cases. In fact this almost appears like an instance of the court, having
assumed the role of the legislature, declining to act as a court.
The court does not explain why in the absence of legislation it is
"compelled" to hold the right to strike subordinate to the port's
immunity. It would seem to be just as logical for the court to feel
"compelled" to hold the right to strike paramount. Also, what does
the court mean by "public health and safety"? There was no evidence
that the Port of Seattle strike was in fact endangering the health or
safety of the public.'
Speculation as to the possible trend indicated by the Port of Seattle
case provokes considerable difficulty. The court's words at face value
seem to say that until there is legislation to the contrary, Washington
courts can feel free to grant injunctions prohibiting all strikes by all

municipal employees.

3

It is yet to be seen whether this reluctance

of the court to ascertain the effect of a strike on the public health and
safety could be overcome by evidence inducing findings of fact by the

trial court that such strike would not endanger the public.
Moreover, taking the "public health and safety" test by itself, a
broad application of it would still result in a general prohibition
against municipal employees striking. Perhaps the law at present is
267, 272, 324 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1958).
Port of Seattle did not even allege the public health and safety
was endangered. In fact, the only mention of this issue was raised by the union: "No
11 152 Wash. Dec.
12 Counsel for the

vital public service was in danger...

The health, safety . .. was in no way jeop-

ardized." Brief for Appellants, p. 13, Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's
Union, 152 Wash. Dec. 267, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
13 Such a rule prohibiting all strikes by municipal employees seems to be in force in
the following states: California: City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades
Council, 94 Cal. App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949) ; Florida: Miami Water Works Union
v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946) ; Michigan: City of Detroit v. Division
26, Amalgamated Ass'n, St. Ry. Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952);
Ohio: City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n, St. Ry. Employees, 85
Ohio App. 153, 90 N.E.2d 711 (1949) ; Pennsylvania: Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa.
611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952). The Florida case seems to indicate that its public employees
do not even have collective bargaining rights.
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simply that Washington's public employees do not have the right to
strike.
It might also be observed that the test of danger to the "public
health and safety" logically ought apply to strikes against privately
owned functions as well as government-owned ones.'" Certainly a
formidable argument can be made that the public safety is as much
endangered by the strike of a privately owned transit system, for
example, as it is when the system is publicly owned. Of course it
is not likely that the court will ever so hold. But what if there were
a general strike of all longshoremen, stopping operations of all the
docks in Seattle? Could the court possibly grant an injunction against
only the striking longshoremen employed by the Port of Seattle, on
the grounds of the danger to public health and safety, while leaving
the major portion of Seattle's dock area inoperative? This would
leave the public safety test in an absurd posture.
To summarize the probable effect of the Port of Seattle cases on
municipal corporation employees, it is first noted that this decision
makes no mention of the right to join a union." With respect to the
right to collective bargaining, the case by implication also restricts
this right to the public safety test.'6 The decision did expressly state
14 This possibility, with respect to the Port of Seattle decision, is raised in MuNiciPAL LAw SERVICE LETTER,

Vol. 8, No. 8 (October 1958) A.B.A. Rep.

16 Apparently schoolteachers do not have the right to join a union in Washington.
Seattle High School Chapter No. 200, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sharples, 159 Wash.
424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930). This case held that a school district had the power to
enforce a resolution which would refuse employment to any teacher who declined
signing an oath that he was not and would not become a member of the teacher's
union. Following the example of other states, it is probable that firemen and policemen
are also so restricted. Newmarker v. Regents, Univ. of California, 325 P.2d 558 (Cal.
1958) (firemen and police) ; Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10
N.W.2d 310 (1943) (police) ; City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 696, 24 So.2d 319
(1946) (police) ; Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935) (firemen).
10 By force of RCW 35.22.350, certain public utility districts have the power to enter
into collective bargaining contracts. This is not the same as giving the employees the
right to collective bargaining, but once such a contract has been made, it is enforceable. Hence this statute places those employees affected by it in a position slightly
advantageous to their counterparts in such states as California. State v. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951).
In the Christie case, since the Port of Olympia had consented to bargain with its
employees, the strict holding of the decision was only that this bargaining agreement
was enforceable. Thus, such a narrow application of the Christie case would do no
more than extend the force of RCW 35.22.350 to all municipal corporations engaged
in proprietary activities.
Viewing the Christie case in light of the case at hand, it must be noted that the Port
of Seattle had consistently refused to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
the union. Hence, the decision prohibiting the Port of Seattle employees from striking
also prohibited them from using their only practical means of compelling the port to
bargain. It therefore appears that while the Port of Seattle case does not expressly
restrict municipal employees' right to collective bargaining, nevertheless its operative
effect will be to limit this right to those instances where the municipal employer has
consented to such bargaining, and the public safety test is satisfied.
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that the right of municipal employees to strike is limited by said test.
Moreover, the court's decision indicates that danger to the public
safety by such a strike will always be presumed until the legislature
provides a formula for the court to apply in such cases. Apparently
this means that Washington municipal employees now have no right
to strike. It remains to be seen whether the legislature or the court
itself will alter the results evidenced by the case examined in this
Note.'
The current rapid expansion of both government and labor would
suggest that conflict between them may increase in the years to follow.
It is unfortunate that the Port of Seattle case has possibly added more
confusion than clarity to this critical subject.
DONALD

P.

LEHNE

Incorporation of Municipalities-Delegation of Legislative
Power. In Port of Tacoma v. Parosa,' the Washington Supreme Court
declared that chapter 173, Laws of 1957, was constitutional. Section 7
(RCW 35.02.070), which was the section most under attack, reads
as follows:
Upon final hearing on a petition for incorporation the board shall
establish and define the boundaries of the proposed city or town, being
authorized to decrease but not increase the area proposed in the petition and any such decrease shall not exceed twenty per cent of the area
proposed; it must also determine the number of inhabitants within
the boundaries it has established: Provided, that the area shall not be
so decreased that the number of inhabitants therein shall be less than
required by RCW 35.02.010. [Three hundred inhabitants.]
The board referred to is the board of county commissioners. Prior
to the passage of the above enactment, the board had almost complete
power to change the proposed boundaries to reflect the findings of
their hearings on petitions for incorporation. The only limitation on
the commission's boundary-fixing power was that the proposed area
could not be enlarged.
At the time the Laws of 1957 went into effect, the Pierce County
Commissioners were in the process of holding hearings on the petition
37 During the recent session of the Washington State legislature, it appeared likely
for some time that one such alteration would be enacted. H.B. 126 provided: "It shall
be lawful for the employees of a publicly owned municipal or urban transit system to
organize into labor unions for the purpose of collective bargaining.... ." This bill
passed the House by a 69-17 margin on February 17, 1959. The Senate, however,
failed to act upon it.

1 152 Wash. Dec. 145, 324 P2d 438 (1958).
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to incorporate a city to be called Tidehaven and to be located near
Tacoma. The petition was filed with the Pierce County Auditor on
Decmber 15, 1956. The proposed municipal corporation was to include two square miles (1,280 acres), which were a part of an area
known as the Industrial Devlopment District, an area being developed
by the Port of Tacoma, plus a continguous sixty-five acres lying
wholly without the Industrial Development District. At the time the
petition was signed, the sixty-five-acre tract had a population of 184
persons, while that of the other area was 187 persons. Subsequently,
as a result of condemnation proceedings by the Port of Tacoma, the
population of this latter area had decreased by nineteen persons, and
sixteen more were scheduled to move by December 1957. The board
then informed the Port of Tacoma that they were bound by the new
laws and lacked the power to exclude more than twenty per cent of
the proposed area. In the subsequent suit, instigated by the Port of
Tacoma, the trial court held the law to be unconstitutional, and on
appeal the supreme court reversed that judgment.
The two arguments against the constitutionality of the act in question were that it was an unlawful delegation of legislative power to
private persons (the registered voters in the area who could petition
for incorporation) 2 and that it violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The latter problem did not need to be decided in the case under discussion, for, as
the court pointed out, the complainant did not indicate what rights
it would lose by the proposed incorporation. Without such a showing,
there could be no decision of unconstitutionality on the grounds of
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
In arguing that the law provided for an unlawful delegation of legislative power to private persons, the primary contention of the complainants was that fixing the boundaries of a municipal corporation
is a legislative function. Since the power of the commissioners to
change the boundaries proposed by the petitioners was so severely
limited, the complainants argued that the power to fix the boundaries
was placed in the hands of the petitioners. As the court correctly
pointed out, it is the commissioners' power to propose boundaries, not
their power to fix boundaries, that is limited. Actually, neither the
petitioners nor the commissioners can fix the boundaries. The boundaries are fixed only when a majority of the people in the designated
2'The
petitioners must be registered resident voters equal in number to 20% of the
voters in the last state election. RCW 35.02.020.
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area vote for incorporation. Therefore, said the court, even assuming that the commissioners had no power to affect the boundaries
and that the power of the petitioners to fix the proposed boundaries
was absolute, the question was: Can the legislature confer on the
majority of people in a given area the right to decide whether such
area shall become a municipal corporation?
Since municipal corporations are creatures of the state and created
by constitutional and statutory provisions, the fixing of all conditions
and requirements of incorporation, including the boundaries of the
corporation, are a legislative function.' In fact, the power of the state
legislature to fix boundaries of municipal corporations is absolute
where such power is not limited by constitutional provisions.4 In
Washington there is such a limitation, for the constitution provides
that the legislature may enact only general laws providing for the
creation of municipal corporations.5 Such a limitation leaves the
legislature only the power to fix the terms and conditions under which
a given area can become a municipality. This of course contemplates
that the legislature must be able to designate some officer or official
body which would determine when the conditions and terms set by
the legislature had been satisfied. Upon such a determination, the
general enactment of the legislature would operate, and a municipality
would be created.
A problem arises when the standards set by the legislature in their
general laws are not complete, in that they leave to the discretion of
the inhabitants the fixing of the boundaries. As pointed out above,
that is exactly what the enactment under discussion does.
In a prior Washington case, Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart,'
holding unconstitutional a former statute providing for the incorporation of cities and towns,' the court said:
While a statute may be conditional and only take effect upon the happening of a future event, we hold that the place where it is to operate,
its "situs," must be fixed definitely by the legislature itself or delegated
to some body or agency capable of exercising legislative functions, and

not left to the will or caprice of localities to determine whether it shall
be applicable to their particular community or not.8
3

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
45 Wheeler School Dist. v. Hawley, 18 Wn.2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010 (1943).
WASH. CONST. art. 11, § 10; art 2, § 28.
67 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405 (1890).
LAWS oF WASHINGTON 1887-8, c. 126, § 1.
8 1 Wash. 98, 107, 23 Pac. 405, 408 (1890).
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Courts of states other than Washington have expressed views similar
to those presented above. Nebraska, while agreeing that an officer or
official body may determine if the conditions necessary to the applicability of a general law are present and that voters of an area affected
may decide whether to give effect to a general law, did find unconstitutional an enactment which "attempted to delegate to a few petitioners the power to fix the boundaries of a new district and to
determine the electorate to pass upon its creation." 9 In the same
opinion, the court distinguished cases involving the merger of two
areas or those in which an area is annexed to an already existing city
and in which the final decision is left in the hands of the voters of the
areas involved.
In an earlier case,"0 the Nebraska court expressed similar views
when considering a statute which provided that when a petition was
properly signed by ten per cent of the freeholders in a given area, the
boundaries of which were fixed by the petitioners, an election would
follow as a matter of course. In holding this act unconstitutional, the
court said:
Upon a closer scrutiny, and a careful consideration of the various
provisions of the statute, it becomes apparent that the petitioners in
the first instance fix the boundaries of the proposed district. To be
sure, the district is not created until the plan is approved by majority
vote of the electors of the district, but as the petitioners fix the boundaries in the petition they can so arrange the boundaries as to exclude
from the district a small plat of land on which any elector might reside."'
In making the above statement, the court was primarily influenced by
the fact that the statute provided for no hearing on the petition or
for any tribunal to determine if any lands were unjustly included or
excluded. Again, it was not the fact that the voters in an election
were going to legislate that bothered the court, but the fact that the
petitioners, and not some responsible legislative body, designated who
these voters were to be.
In passing upon the validity of the statute in question and making
the assumption that the petitioners had the power to fix the proposed
boundaries, the Washington court placed the case squarely within the
situation covered by the rule propounded by the Nebraska court in
the above cases. By upholding the enactment, the Washington court
9 Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118, 231 N.W. 689 (1930).
10 Elliott v. Wille, 112 Neb. 86, 200 N.W. 347 (1924).

1 Id. at 200 N.W. 348.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 34

not only took a stand contrary to that of the Nebraska court but was
willing to state that "insofar as Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart,
supra, is in conflict with this decision, it is hereby overruled." 12
This latter step may not be as significant as it at first seems. First
of all, the facts of the Kelly case seem to make it authority only for
the rule that the legislature may not delegate legislative functions to
the judiciary department under the separation of powers clause of
the state constitution." According to an annotation, 4 this Washington
decision is not in accord with the decisions in a majority of jurisdictions. "In a minority of the cases it is held that a statute which
imposes on a judicial court the exercise of a non-judicial function in
regard to the creation or change of municipal corporations is unconstitutional under the provisions separating the powers of the government." 5 In addition, it must be noted that the Kelly decision was
based upon facts arising prior to the adoption of the state constitution with its provision restricting the legislature to general laws
providing for the creation of municipal corporations.
In taking the stand that it does in the Parosacase, the Washington
court is not without support in other jurisdictions. Several cases offering varying degrees of support are cited in the opinion. In at least one
of these, Dowell v. Board of Educ., 6 the Oklahoma court discussed
the Nebraska rule and decided directly to the contrary on facts much
like those in a Nebraska case. Apparently Oklahoma was more
swayed by the possible benefits derived from allowing local people to
make decisions in local matters than by the fear of gerrymandering
which concerned the Nebraska court.
As mentioned above, the Washington court took the stand it did
after accepting the complainant's contention that the statute under
attack allowed the petitioners to fix the proposed boundaries and
thereby determine the electorate which was to decide whether to
incorporate. If, instead of accepting this contention, the court had
found that the statute, although severely limiting the power of the
county commissioners to change the proposed boundaries, did leave
the final determination with the commissioners, the Washington statute
would have satisfied the Nebraska rule.
Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 152 Wash. Dec. 145, 155, 324 P.2d 438, 445 (1958).
§ 1, amend. 7.
'4 Annot., 69 A.L.R. 266 (1930).
15 Id. at 294-95.
16185 Okla. 342, 91 P.2d 771 (1939).
17 Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118, 231 N.W. 689 (1930).
12

13 WASH. CONST. art. 2,
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It is only when the proposed area includes exactly three hundred
people that the commissioners are entirely without discretion as to
the proposed boundaries. Since, in the case being noted, the area
contained more than three hundred people, complainants could not
argue unconstitutionality on that ground. Therefore, it would seem
that the court could have reached the finding suggested above.
If the court did not overlook this possibility, but forced itself to
take a stand on the Nebraska rule, then, by deciding contra to the
Nebraska cases, the court has demonstrated its faith in the ability
of the people properly to handle matters primarily of local concern.
This would seem to follow the spirit of the state constitution, which
provides for home-rule charters' for the cities of Washington.
If, as the facts of this case seem to indicate, this statute allows
newly incroporated areas to include within their city limits property
which will not benefit from being part of the new municipality but
will add to the city's taxation revenues, there is some question as to
whether this can be labeled "properly handled local affairs." Perhaps, therefore, the final question to be asked is: Is the faith in the
ability of the people well founded?
Jo-N F. COLoROVE
Legislative Power of First-Class Cities-Use of Parking Meters
for Private Advertising Purposes Upheld. In Winkenwerder v. City
of Yakima,' the court has declared that a first-class city in the State
of Washington may contract with a private business, allowing such
business to use the tops of city parking meters for advertising purposes.
On July 26, 1955, the Yakima city commission passed ordinance
number B-1720 providing for such use of its parking meters. The
ordinance stipulated the number of meters to be so used and the consideration to be paid the city. All revenue so obtained was to be used
in offsetting part of the city's traffic regulation expense. The ordinance
further provided that there should be no interference with, or obstruction of, the use of the meters for the regulation of parking. Pursuant
to this ordinance, a contract was entered into granting advertising
use of parking meters for a period of six months with renewal at the
option of the city. A copy of this agreement, attached to the ordinance
11 State ex. rel. Everett Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wn.2d 114, 278 P.2d 662

(1955) ; WASH. CoNsT. art. 11, § 10.

1152 Wash. Dec. 547, 328 P.2d 873 (1958).
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and made a part of it, contained provisions making all advertising
subject to approval of the city commission, expressly restricting the
use of such signs for political and religious advertising, banning the
advertisement of intoxicating beverages, and stipulating how near to
a given business advertising of a competitor could be located.
A retail hardware and appliance dealer and a publishing company,
both owning property and doing business on streets where signs
approximately twelve inches long and four inches high had been
affixed to parking meters, challenged both the ordinance and the agreement by asking for a declaratory judgment declaring them invalid.
Further relief in the form of an injunction was requested. The Superior
Court of Yakima County entered a judgment for the complainants, and
the state supreme court, in an opinion by Judge Finley, reversed that
decision.
The first issue to be settled concerned the scope of the legislative
power of first-class cities in Washington. Municipal corporations are
creatures of the state, created by constitutional provisions and statutory enactments, and have no inherent powers. In this respect, corporation powers are quite different from those of the state itself. While
the state constitution is an instrument limiting the powers of the state,
leaving with the state all powers not thereby taken away,2 consitutional provisions and general laws enumerating the powers of corporations are normally looked upon, as is the Federal Constitution, as
grants of power, denying all powers except those granted. Since
first-class cities are corporations, it would seem that their powers
would be limited to those expressly granted by the state constitution
and state legislative enactments, with further limitations possibly to
be found in the individual city charters. At most, such powers, it
seems, might be extended to include those necessarily implied by the
expressly granted powers.'
In Pacific First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 4 the
court said that municipal authorities can exercise no powers except
those expressly granted and that, if doubt should arise as to their
right to exercise any specific power, such right must be denied. This
is in line with the general rule of statutory construction and interpretation that statutes in derogation of the common law, among which
2 Union High School Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers, 26 Wn2d 1, 172 P.2d 591 (1946).
3 State ex rel Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, 160 Pac. 755 (1916).
4 27 Wn.2d 347, 178 P2d 351 (1947).
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are statutes granting powers to corporations, are to be strictly construed.'
In Washington, where cities enjoy "home rule," there is at least
one exception to the above-stated rules. Article XI, section 10, of the
state constitution gives cities of 20,000 or more population permission
to frame their own charters, subject to, and consistent with, the constitution and statutes of Washington. In addition to this, statutes
relating to first-class cities must be liberally rather than strictly construed if the legislative intent is to be carried out.' Such constitutional and statutory provisions led the Washington court in State ex
rel. Ennis v. Superior Court' to say that it is evident that in Washington cities of the first class are vested with very extensive powers,
subject to and controlled only by general laws. The court further said
that the rule of resolving doubt concerning the existence of power
against municipal corporations does not apply when such a corporation is a city of the first class. In other cases the court has in effect
said that the only limitation upon the powers of cities of the first class
is the limitation that they do not contravene constitutional or statutory provisions.' In the Winkenwerder case, the court made it clear
how far it was willing to go in this direction by saying, "a city of the
first class has as broad legislative powers as the state, except when
restricted by enactments of the state legislature." 9
In making the above statement, the court apparently did not consider its conflict with the decisions in cases concerning the power of
eminent domain. While, within its own jurisdiction, a state possesses
an inherent power of eminent domain,"0 a municipal corporation can
exercise such a power only when it has been expressly authorized by
the legislature and only through a use of those procedures expressly
authorized. 1 In other words, statutes conferring the power of eminent
5 In re Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926).
,3
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 8982. This section is from Rem. Comp. Stat. of Washington
for the year 1922. Title LX, Municipal Corporations; Chapter VII, Cities of First
Class, General Provisions; § 8982, Liberal Construction, reads: "The rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application
to this act, but the same shall be liberally construed for the purposes of carrying out
the objects for which this act is intended."
7153 Wash. 139, 279 Pac. 601 (1929).
"Washington Fruit and Prod. Co. v. Yakima, 3 Wn.2d 152, 100 P.2d 8 (1940);
Walker v. Spokane, 62 Wash. 312, 113 Pac. 775 (1911); State ex rel. Griffiths v.
Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 33 P.2d 94 (1934).
0 152 Wash., Dec. 547, 552, 328 P.2d 873, 878 (1958).
10 State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, 46 Wn.2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955) ; 18 Am. JUR.,
Eminent Domain, § 19 (1938).
11 Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991 (1909) ; 18 Am. JuR., Eminent
Domain, § 27 (1938).
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domain must be strictly construed. It seems hardly possible that the
court meant to overrule this principle without even mentioning it; it
was applied as recently as 1955 in Tepley v. Sumerlin.' The conclusion that must be reached is that the power of eminent domain will
continue to be an apparent exception to the rule that a first-class city
has as broad legislative powers as does the state.
Since the complainants did not allege that the ordinance passed was
inconsistent with any state legislative enactment, it need only be
determined whether the power to pass such an ordinance is denied by
the state constitution or the Yakima charter.
The general rule is that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an ordinance."3 Since there was no question that the
parking meters concerned were the property of the city, the issue to
be decided was whether the city had the power to use its property
for advertising purposes. By the nature of their challenge, complainants contended, in effect, that secondary or incidental uses of public
property for private gain are unconstitutional unless such uses justify
eminent domain proceedings.
Since it has been decided that a first-class city has legislative power
comparable to that of the state, an examination of the state's powers
with regard to secondary uses of public property is enlightening.
The case of State ex rel. York v. Board of County Comm'rs,"'4 a case
quoted from at length in the opinion under discussion, contains perhaps the best examination of such state powers. In dealing with the
permissible secondary uses of state highways, the court declared in
the York case that, as long as the streets and highways are maintained
for their primary purposes, abutting landowners are entitled to compensation only when a secondary use results in an unreasonable
encroachment upon their rights. Only when the encroachment is
unreasonable is there a constitutional taking or damaging, so that the
interference must be justified as for the public use. In as much as it
was found that there was no obstruction of Winkenwerder's right of
access or of the public's view of his store and no interference with
public passage or the primary function of parking meters, it was concluded that there was no "unreasonable" encroachment upon anyone's rights.
In addition to justifying such an incidental use of public property
12 46

Wn.2d 504, 282 P.2d 827 (1955).
13 Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wn.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36 (1940).
14 28 Wn.2d 891, 184 P.2d 577 (1947).
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for private gain, the court quite plausibly pointed out that the revenue
gained which would lighten the public tax burden, public safety slogans
which were to be installed in some of the signs free of charge, as well
as the advertising itself, were all public benefits. This would mean
that the use sanctioned by the ordinance in question could be classed
as public in nature.
The only other allegation of unconstitutionality seemed to stem
from an erroneous belief on the part of the complainant publisher that
constitutional prohibitions against unlawful taking of property without compensation or without due process of law protected him from
business competition.15
The complainants also strongly contended that the ordinance failed
to comply with article 11, section 2 of the Yakima charter which reads:
No franchise or right to occupy or use the streets, highways, bridges,
or public places of the city shall be granted, renewed or extended
except by ordinance, which ordinance shall be submitted to a vote of
the electors of the city at a general or special election and shall not
become operative unless approved by a majority of the electors voting
upon said franchise; ...

The city argued that the words "or right to occupy or use the
streets, highways, bridges, or public places of the city," meant the
same thing as "franchise" when used in an article entitled "Franchises." It was the city's further contention that the contract entered
into was something less than a franchise and therefore was not subject to the voting requirement of the charter. Whether the ordinance
and incorporated agreement constituted the granting of a franchise
0
or something less is rather hard to determine. In Lankam v. Forney"
the court attached the label "franchise" to what in that case was a
"formal and permanent contract." Other cases have given a variety
of meanings to the term "franchise."'"
15 Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934).
"1
196 Wash. 62, 81 P.2d 777 (1938).
17 1n a case involving the right to put poles, wires, and conduits in the public streets,
a franchise was said to be "a special privilege which does not belong to citizens of
common right." State ex rel. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv., 19
NVn.2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943). In City Sanitary Serv. Co. v. Rausch, 10 Wn.2d 446,
117 P.2d 225 (1941), the exclusive right to collect garbage for a certain period of
time was held not to be a franchise. In a case where a company was authorized to
maintain lines and conduits for steam and hot water in the streets, the word "franchise" simply meant a right granted to a corporation or an individual to do things
which could not otherwise be done by them. Washington Water Power Co. v. Rooney,
3 Wn.2d 642, 101 P.2d 580 (1940). In another case involving the right to put telephone poles in streets and alleys, the court said that "a 'franchise' is in the nature of
a contract and cannot be altered or amended during its life by the grantor to the detriment of the grantee by adding new burdens thereto." Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. Everett, 97
Wash. 259, 166 Pac. 650 (1917).
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While under these cases it is unclear whether the agreement in question does grant what is generally called a franchise, it is not clear what
better name could be attached to the advertising company's right. A
license is in no sense a contract between the state and licensee. A
license is usually granted by parol, is often given without consideration,
and may be revoked at the will of the licensor. 8 The advertising company's right is clearly something more than a license.
The court avoided having to decide just what the extent of the
interest granted was. After agreeing with the city in its construction
of section 2 of article 11, it went on to cite the part of section 3 that
reads, "no franchise shall be granted unless there be inserted therein
a provision that the city may acquire the public utility for the exercise
of which the franchise is granted ...." Art. 11 therefore applies only
to franchises and at that only to franchises granted to public utilities.
In arriving at its construction of the charter, the court said that,
since the word franchise admits of many meanings, it is appropriate
to look at the other words in the article to determine the meaning
intended by the drafters. It was clear to the court that the words
"or right to use or occupy" were inserted only to help in solving this
problem. It is interesting to note that in Washington Fruit and Prod.
Co. v. City of Yakima, 9 the court was faced with deciding whether
the use of the streets by a power company in supplying lighting to
the city was subject to the requirements of Art. 11. Since the court
declared that the use in that case was a license rather than a franchise, it could seemingly have disposed of that problem through the
simple construction technique employed in the principal case. Instead
the court treated the phrase "or right to occupy or use the streets"
separately from that part of the article dealing with franchises and
decided the issue on other grounds.
As a result of the decision in Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, there
is no longer any question as to the scope of the legislative power of
cities of the first class. It is equal to the legislative power of the
state, limited only by constitutional provisions, state legislative enactments, and city charters. This conclusion should be tempered by
adding that municipal powers of eminent domain are more constricted.
A construction has been placed upon article 11 of Yakima's city
charter which will in the future allow little dispute as to what uses of
isWiseman v. Eastman, 21 Wash. 163, 57 Pac. 398 (1899).
19 3 Wn.2d 152, 100 P.2d 8 (1940).
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public property will be subject to the voting requirement. Only the
preliminary question of whether the use granted to a public utility
is a franchise will need to be considered. While this question can
present considerable difficulty, no longer will it be necessary to decide
whether the use falls under the phrase "right to occupy or use," as
well as "franchise."
It could be argued that this decision opens the door to any use of
any public property for commercial advertising purposes. As stated
by a Pennsylvania court:
If the city's position is tenable, it could then divert to private and
commercial use all forms of apparatus maintained by the city on sidewalks of private property. Thus, the city's fire plugs, fire alarm boxes,
police call boxes, and traffic light standards could be utilized by the city
for commercial advertising,
if the principal for which defendants are
2
here contending is valid'.
Washington, however, was not swayed by "a parade of horrible possibilities," the court reserving decision on other situations until they
became realities. Thus, the Winkenwerder case extended the doctrine
of incidental and secondary uses generally to allow city property to
be used for advertising purposes, without stating that all such uses
JoiaN F. COLGROVE
would, in the future, be upheld.
Eminent Domain-Market Value-Valuation of Mineral Deposits. In State v. Mottman Mercantile Co.' a divided court held evidence of the value per unit of mineral deposits to be admissible in
determining the market value of land in condemnation proceedings.
As empowered by statute,2 the state sought condemnation of 15.6 acres
of land, from which it planned to extract gravel for use in an adjacent
highway construction project. A dispute arose over the proper amount
of compensation to be awarded for the tract.
The state's witnesses testified to the effect that the highest value
of the property was as farm land rather than as a gravel pit because
of the excess of supply over demand for gravel in the area. These
witnesses determined that the tract's value as farmland was between
$125.00 and $150.00 per acre. The landowner's witness, however,
testified that the property's highest value was as a potential source
20o
Chestnut Hill & At. Airy Business Men's Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 87 Pa. D. & C.
209 (1954).
151 Wn.2d 722, 321 P.2d 912 (1958).
2 RCV 47.12.010.
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of gravel (the state having conceded that the site contained 283,000
cubic yards of usable material) and that as such it had a market
value of $600.00 an acre. To support this theory, the landowner
offered to prove by his witness that the value of the gravel contained
on the tract was ten cents per yard. The state objected to this offer
on the ground that it was based on "an improper method of arriving
at a conclusion of value." The objection was sustained. A verdict
was given in the amount of $3,350.00, based on an evaluation of
$150.00 per acre plus an additional $1,000.00, added by stipulation
of the parties, for the timber on the property. The landowner appealed,
citing as error the trial court's refusal of his offer of proof of the value
per unit of the gravel in place in the condemned land. The judgment
was reversed, the supreme court maintaining that evidence of value
per unit of minerals was admissible, not as a precise measure of value,
but as an explanation or foundation for estimates made of the market
value of the property.
In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized the well-established
doctrine that the value of mineral-bearing property should not be
determined by multiplying the assumed amount of mineral deposits
by a given unit price.' Such a method of evaluation has been considered too speculative, first because of the uncertainties and contingencies of supply and demand, and secondly because of the speculative
nature of quantitative estimates themselves.4
Though agreeing with this theory, the court denied that evidence
of the unit price of gravel was improper. In other words, the product
of the factor of quantity (as conceded by the state) multiplied by the
factor of price per unit was held inadmissible; but the factors themselves were held admissible. Recognizing that the criterion of compensation is the market value of the land in a voluntary sale between
an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy,5 the court
concluded that exclusion of the factors as well as the product would
deprive the jury of a proper guide in determining the fair market
value of the land. The court quoted NIcHoLs, EMINENT DoMn, as
follows: "If the extent and quality and value of the stone as it lies on
3 United States v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamund Lake, California, 143 F.Supp. 314
(S.D.Cal. 1956) ; 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 248 (3d ed. 1951) ; Horgan, Mineral
Valiation in Eminent Domain Cases, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 163 (1956) ; Annot., 156 A.L.R.
1423 (1945).
4NicnoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 248 (3d ed. 1951), and authorities cited.
5 Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 407 (1879) ; Phillips v. United States, 243 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Seattle & M. Ry. v. Roeder, 30
Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498 (1902) ; Annot, 156 A.L.R. 1416 (1945).
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the land may not be considered, there would be no way by which the
value of the land with the minerals could be shown." ' In concluding
this point, the court observed that, "unless we can say that if we were
buying a gravel pit we would not regard the amount of the gravel, or
its value in the land, as a relevant fact in determining its market value,
we must of necessity hold that the evidence offered should have been
admitted." 7
Up to the point of admitting evidence of unit price, the court has a
substantial foundation of both case and textual authority. Market
value based upon a voluntary transaction between the parties is the
commonly accepted standard of compensation.8 It is also generally
stated that in evaluating land, consideration must be given to the existence of mineral deposits but that it is error to determine the compensation therefor by finding the product of the quantity of the
mineral multiplied by the price per unit."
Only in admitting evidence of unit price, then, does the court enter
into an area of less uniform doctrine. In this area the court relies
on statements in Seattle & M. Ry. v. Roeder,"° and National Brick
Co. v. United States," to the general effect that the value of the mineral in place is evidence necessary for the jury to have in order to
ascertain the value of the land. Other authorities go only so far as
to state that unit price may be considered only by an expert as a basis
upon which he may in part base his evaluation. 2 Nichols, upon a
page subsequent to that cited by the court, says, in reference to the
quantity and quality of mineral deposits, "these are elements only to
be considered with others in determining the value of the property,"
and "such factors are proper when treated only as contributory factors
04 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 245 (3d ed. 1951).
7 51 Wn.2d 722, 728, 321 P.2d 912, 916.
8

Town of Issaquah, 31 Wn.2d 556, 197 P.2d 1018 (1948); Sacramento Southern
R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 Pac. 979 (1909) ; United States Gypsum Co. v.
Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 130, 106 N.E.2d 677 (1952) ; In re Board
of Water Supply of City of New York, 277 N.Y. 452, 14 N.E2d 789 (1938) ; United
States v. Toronto, H. & B. Nay. Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949); 4 NicHoLs, EmINENT
DOMAIN 27 (3d ed. 1951), and authorities cited.
9 Forest Preserve Dist. v. Caraher, 229 Ill. 11, 132 N.E. 211 (1921) ; Nedrow v.
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 246 Iowa 1075, 61 N.W2d 687 (1953); Ross v.
Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park, 90 N.J.L. 461, 101 Atl. 60 (1917); 1
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EmINENT DOMAIN, § 165 (2d ed. 1953) and
authorities cited.
10 30 Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498 (1902).
11 131 F.2d 30, 31 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
12 United States v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamund Lake, California, 143 F.Supp.
314 (S.D.Cal. 1956) ; United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.Cal.
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to the ascertainment of market value rather than as the criterion
thereof." "3
The dissenting opinions in the Mottman case criticize the admission of unit-price evidence on the ground that it tends to invite the
jurors to make a separate evaluation of the worth of the gravel in
their own minds, based upon the factors of quantity and unit price.
They maintain that the only permissible use of unit price is by an
expert witness, using it, not as a basis for determining the value of
the mineral, but as a factor in evaluating the tract of land as a whole.
Though not persuasive enough under the present circumstances to
alter the opinion of the majority, this theory shows the direction from
which attacks upon unit price evidence might come. While held
admissible in the Mottman case, it would be inaccurate to state without qualifications that this case completely opens the way for the
admission of such evidence. The product of unit price multiplied by
quantity is never admissible, nor are estimates of the value of minerals after removal from the land. Unit price evidence is properly
introduced only in explanation and support of estimates made, not
of the separate value of the minerals, but of the market value of the
property with the minerals in place.
JA-Es D. NUTTING
Additional Compensation to Elected Officials. Two recent cases involving substantially similar questions of law were initiated by the attorney general, in which
he petitioned for writs of mandamus to prevent the further issuance of warrants for
expense allowances to certain elected officials: State ex rel. O'Connell v. Yelle, 51
Wn.2d 594, 320 P.2d 1079 (1958), involving commuting and living expenses for the
secretary of state, state auditor, and other officials semi-permanently residing at
Olympia, pursuant to Laws of 1957, ch. 300, p. 1231; and State ex rel. O'Connell v,.
Yelle, 51 Wn.2d 620, 320 P.2d 1086 (1958), involving four-hundred-dollar monthly
payments to the speaker of the house for time spent performing duties at Olympia

after the end of the regular legislative session, pursuant to Laws of 1957, ch. 300,
p. 1223.
In both instances the attorney general asserted that such payments were in violation of the Washington Constitution, art. II, § 25, and art. III, § 25, and art. XXVII,
amendment 20, § 1, which sections state in essence that the compensation to an elected
official shall not be increased during his term of office. The court agreed with the
attorney general in both cases and ordered the state auditor to desist from issuing any
further warrants for the above-mentioned purposes.
The court found it necessary to distinguish the case of State ex. rel. Todd. v. Yelle,
7 Wn.2d 443, 110 P.2d 162 (1941), in which legislation granting to legislators five
dollars per day for traveling and living expenses while in Olympia had been held
constitutional. The point made by the court in that case was that the five-dollar-perday allowance was not additional compensation but recompense for expenses neces23

4 NicHoLs, EmINENT DOMAIN 248 (3d ed. 1951).
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sarily incurred because of the cost of keeping up two residences for the sixty-day
period. By way of contrast with the present cases, the court pointed out that semipermanent officials would be expected to make their residence at Olympia and therefore would not have such recompensible expenses, and the additional money paid them
would not be "expense" money but more properly would be classified as additional
compensation. The court rejected the argument that, since legislators as well as semipermanent officials should anticipate certain necessary incidental expenses associated
with the job they sought, any allowances made to one group should be equally allowable to the other.
In the second case, the house resolution purporting to authorize additional pay for
the speaker of the house was attacked on the grounds of its being an act by one branch
of the legislature regarding a subject matter which required action by the legislature
as a whole, according to art. XXVIII, amend. 20, § 1. This attack upon the validity
of the resolution itself was not decisive, however, as the court rested its decision on
the unconstitutional objective of the resolution. The court found that the resolution
would have the effect of increasing an elected official's compensation during his term
of office and was therefore unconstitutional.
The argument was advanced that the speaker of the house should be looked upon as
having a dual capacity because of the many duties he is required to perform in addition
to his legislative functions, such as staying four or five months after the legislative
session at Olympia to wind up legislative activities. The court declined to regard the
speaker as having such a dual capacity. Since the speaker has over the past decade
and more received additional sums of money for clearly discernible expenses not
incurred by the other members of the legislature, it seems the court preferred to look
at form rather than substance when it decided to reject the dual-capacity theory.
Since the court seemed reluctant to deviate from a literal interpretation of the constitution, the legislature in drafting future measures providing for their own reimbursement for expenses will have to use wording specifically to negative the idea that they
are voting themselves additional compensation during a term of office.
Zoning Law-Effect of Change in Zoning Ordinance on Prior Application for
Building Permit. In Hull v. Himt, 153 Wash. Dec. 109, 331 P.2d 856 (1958), the
Washington court held that where an application for a building permit had been filed,
a subsequent change in the zoning law had no effect upon a permit issued in accordance
with the prior law.
On January 16, 1958, respondents applied for a building permit to build a twelvestory apartment building in Seattle. Respondents, at that time, did not own building
rights in all of the land on which the apartment was to be built. The permit was
issued on February 26, the day before a new zoning ordinance which limited all
buildings in that area to a height of thirty-five feet, became effective. Appellant, a
neighboring landowner whose scenic view would be blocked by the proposed apartment building, sought an injunction to prevent the construction. The injunction was
denied, and the state supreme court affirmed.
The court acknowledged the general rule to be that a building permit can be
revoked by subsequent changes in zoning law which prohibit buildings of the kind
described in the application for the permit. Most jurisdictions, added the court,
modify this general rule with the exception that a permittee who has changed his
position in reliance on the permit has a vested right, protected by the courts. Since
respondents had not changed their position before the new zoning law became effective,
they did not come within the recognized exception of the majority rule.
The Washington court had previously added another exception to the general rule
when, in State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellemve, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954), it held
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that an owner of property acquired a vested right to put his property to any use sanctioned by the zoning law in effect at the time he made an application for a permit. The
court has now renounced the majority rule and not merely created another exception.
In the Hull case, apparently the fact that the permit was issued before the new ordinance became effective was not important. In taking its stand contrary to the weight
of authority, the court said, "The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that
the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit,
if that permit is thereafter issued." (Emphasis added.)
Charter Amendment of Municipal Corporation-Notice. In the case of Burns v.
Alderson, 51 Wn2d 810, 322 P2d 359 (1958), the validity of a Yakima election, in
which its city charter was amended by initiative, was challenged as being unconstitutional. The court decided (5 to 4) that the election results were void because the proponents of the charter amendment had failed to comply with the state constitutional
requirement in art. X, § 10, of giving voters thirty days notice of pending elections.
The principal differences of opinion revolved around the question of whether the constitutional requirement of notice was meant to apply to the initiative method of amending city charters or whether it was limited to methods existing at the time the constitutional provision was adopted. Under the majority view, the constitutional notice
was held a mandatory requirement applicable to methods unknown at the time the constitution was adopted.
The fact that the legislature stated, via the 1903 statute creating the initiative mode
of change, that it was to be a concurrent and additional method did no dissuade the
majority from their position. The court concluded that, although fifteen per cent of
the voters had signed a petition prior to the election, this was not compliance with the
thirty-day notice requirement of the constitution.
Four judges dissented, contending that, since the obvious purpose of the constitutional language was to insure notice to interested voters, the subsequently conceived
initiative method of amendment substantially accomplished this purpose. The dissenting view was that the substantive effect should have over-ridden the strict literal meaning given the constitution.

TAX
Excise Tax on Sale of Real Estate-Effect of Subsequent Rescission. In Perkins
v. King County, 51 Wn.2d 761, 321 P.2d 903 (1958), the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed a dismissal by the Superior Court of King County of an action against King
County for the refund of an excise tax paid by the appellant. The tax was imposed
upon the execution of a contract of sale under which the appellant was to transfer
certain real estate to a purchaser. Subsequently, the parties to the contract of sale
made an agreement to rescind. Appellant then applied for a refund of the excise tax
on real estate sales which he had paid and was refused. He then brought an action
to recover.
The court, in affirming the lower court action, referred to the language of RCW
28.45.010, which states that "the term 'sale'... shall include ... any contract for...
conveyance... or transfer" of ownership or title to real property. The court then
reasoned that, since a contract of sale falls within the definition of the term "sale" in
RCW 28.45.010, it was a taxable event at the time it occurred. The court rejected the
appellant's contention that the operative effect of an agreement to rescind is to make
the contract void at its inception-in effect, as though it never happened.
The contract to rescind is a separate and distinct agreement between the parties,
under which each releases the other from further contract obligations under the

